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Abstract 
Social engineering is the technique in which the attacker sends messages to build a relationship with the 
victim and convinces the victim to take some actions that lead to significant damages and losses. 
Industry and law enforcement reports indicate that social engineering incidents costs organizations 
billions of dollars. Phishing is the most pervasive social engineering attack. While email filtering and 
warning messages have been implemented for over three decades, organizations are constantly falling 
for phishing attacks. Prior research indicated that attackers use phishing emails to create an urgency and 
fear response in their victims causing them to use quick heuristics, which leads to human errors. Humans 
use two types of decision-making processes: a heuristic decision, which is a quick, instinctual decision-
making process known as ‘System One’, and a second, known as ‘System Two,’ that is a slow, logical 
process requiring attention. ‘System Two’ is often triggered by a pause in the decision-making process. 
Additionally, timers were found in other research fields (medicine, transportation, etc.) to affect users’ 
judgement and reduce human errors. Therefore, the main goal of this work-in-progress research study is 
to determine through experimental field study whether requiring email users to pause by displaying a 
phishing email warning with a timer, has any effect on users falling to simulated phishing attacks. This 
paper will outline the rationale and the process proposed for the validation of the field experiments with 
Subject Matter Experts (SMEs). Limitations of the proposed study and recommendation for further 
research are provided. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Phishing and other types of social engineering incidents cost organizations 
billions of dollars a year (FBI, 2018; Musuva et al., 2019; Salahdine & Kaabouch, 
2019; Thomas, 2018). In addition, phishing continues to present a significant threat 
to users in both their personal and professional lives leading to personal or corporate 
data as well as significant financial loss (Carlton et al., 2018). Social engineering 
attacks continue to inflict significant damages to organizations including the recent 
high-profile attack against Twitter (Iyengar, 2020). The number of phishing email 
campaigns detected by the Anti-Phishing Working Group (2020) in the first quarter 
of 2020 was 139,685, up from the previous quarter, and the number of email users 
worldwide is over 3.8 billion and expected to increase to 4.3 billion by the end of 
2022 (Clement, 2019). In 2018, 85% of 1001 respondents to a survey of white-
collar workers stated that they use their smartphones to check their email (Clement, 
2019).  
Attackers use phishing to create a fear or excited response in their victims (Goel 
et al., 2017; Jain et al., 2016) which causes victims to use a quick, emotional 
response using heuristics rather than a logical, thought-through response. Even 
when warned, users choose to put aside security concerns when deciding whether 
or not to follow links presented in an email (Vance et al., 2018). A possible 
explanation for this is that users do not properly evaluate the risk involved in 
clicking on an unknown link, especially when overworked (Bravo-Lillo et al., 
2011). Furthermore, users also move to a heuristic process as they become more 
fatigued (Arazy et al., 2017), and it appears that this is also the case when they are 
deciding whether a displayed link is safe to follow or not. By requiring the user to 
pause, the user’s thought stream may be interrupted, and the user may be switched 
to logical thinking. Jensen et al. (2017) suggested that requiring the user to pause 
will encourage the user to reflect on the content of an email message. Users are 
likely to engage logical thinking the first time they see a warning (Anderson et al., 
2016), but tasks that are repeated appear to be processed using heuristics. This 
pattern of action often results in an error in judgement regarding the safety of a 
displayed link (Anderson et al., 2016). Repetitive tasks are recognized by the brain 
and the effort extended to accomplish these tasks is diminished. Because of the 
diminished effort put forth by the brain, static warnings lose effectiveness over time 
(Anderson et al., 2016) and heuristics take over (Kahneman, 2011). Additionally, 
countdown timers have been found to be effective in different research fields, 
including medicine (Marto et al., 2016) and in pedestrian crosswalks (Keegan & 
O’Mahony, 2003). Count-up timers have been used to measure vigilance and 
appear to be valuable to help reduce human error in other contexts (Lo et al., 2019). 
However, it appears that very limited attention has been provided to the role of 
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counters and pause levels for users when provided with potentially malicious 
emails. It is our assumption and the aim of this study to investigate if a countdown 
or count-up timer will move users from a heuristic, System One thought process to 
a logical, System Two thought process to reduce clicking on potentially malicious 
links in emails.  
The overarching research problem that this study will address is that users make 
judgement errors when evaluating the risks involved in clicking on an unknown 
link in an email. The need for this work is demonstrated by the works of Anderson 
et al. (2016), who used functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) to 
demonstrate that users quickly habituate to static warnings, and by Amran et al. 
(2018) who stated that users will often consider security warnings irrelevant or even 
try to evade them. This proposed study builds on previous research by Ball et al. 
(2015) and by Kahneman (2011). Ball et al. (2015) suggested that additional studies 
are required to understand what factors lead to habit as well as the relationship 
between habit and practice in the context of information security. They found that 
awareness of risks was not a significant influence over practice, and rather that habit 
was a stronger influence. Moreover, little is known on the specific amount of time 
users should be asked to pause to adjust their habit in the context of phishing emails 
Therefore, this study is attempting to investigate if requiring the user to pause 
before taking any actions such as clicking on a link or an attachment will have an 
impact on the amount of successful phishing emails sent to employees. In this paper 
we outline the first part of a larger research study in which we focus on validating 
a proposed set of field experiments by a panel of Subject Matter Experts (SMEs). 
Specifically, the main research question that this study will address is: According 
to cybersecurity SMEs, at what level should the countdown or count-up timer be 
set, as well as what level of functional correctness and validity is sufficient for the 
proposed set of field experiments? Specifically, the proposed Research Questions 
(RQs) are: 
RQ1.  What are the three timer levels to require the user to pause that 
should be used to assess users’ ability to identify malicious links in 
email according to cybersecurity SMEs? 
RQ2.  What level of functional correctness and validity of the proposed set 
of field experiments is sufficient according cybersecurity SMEs? 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Social Engineering 
 Social engineering is one of the most under researched and most effective 
cybercrimes (Jain et al., 2016). Social engineering is defined as “the art of 
exploiting the weakest link of information security systems: the people who are 
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using them” (Jain et al., 2016, p. 94). Mihelič et al. (2019) called the human factor 
in social engineering a lever that is exploited by social engineers. Salahdine and 
Kaabouch (2019) defined four stages of a social engineering attack: (1) information 
gathering; (2) hook relationship; (3) play exploitation and execution; as well as (4) 
out. In the information gathering stage, the social engineer collects information 
about their target, also known as reconnaissance. In the hook relationship phase, 
the social engineer baits the victim with fear or excitement (Goel et al., 2017). In 
the play exploitation and execution phase, the attacker executes the attack, while in 
the out phase, the attacker leaves with actions taken to remove any traces of the 
attack.  
Technical solutions to combat social engineering typically don’t work 
(Krombholz et al., 2015). Jain et al. (2016) went as far as to say that there are no 
technical solutions to the problem of social engineering. Prior literature also 
documented that users are often too confident in their ability to detect a social 
engineering attack (Krombholz et al., 2015), partially because social engineers are 
becoming more devious. This means that suggestions for countering social 
engineering just two years ago don’t appear to be useful nowadays. For example, 
in 2018, Abass gave the advice to look for the Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure 
(HTTPS) in a Universal Resource Locator (URL) within suspected phishing emails, 
but in 2020, the Anti-Phishing Working Group advised not to rely on presence of 
the HTTPS protocol since up to 75% of attackers now use websites that includes 
the HTTPS protocol (Anti-Phishing Working Group, 2020).  
While phishing is only one of 20 different kinds of social engineering defined 
by Salahdine and Kaabouch (2019), it is the most common type of social 
engineering attack. Salahdine and Kaabouch (2019) organized phishing attacks into 
five categories: spear, whaling, vishing, interactive voice response, and Business 
Email Compromise (BEC). A spear phishing attack is one in which the attacker 
targets a particular group of people, such as employees of a particular company or 
users of a particular website (Krombholz et al., 2015). A whaling attack is a subset 
of a spear phishing attack in which the high-profile members of the target group are 
targeted (Krombholz et al., 2015). A vishing attack is a phone attack in which the 
attacker convinces the victim to give up some piece of confidential information, 
and an interactive voice response attack is a subset of a vishing attack in which the 
attacker pretends to be an interactive voice-controlled computer (Salahdine & 
Kaabouch, 2019). A BEC attack is one in which the attacker pretends to be a high-
ranking member of the victim’s organization and asks for a secure transaction, such 
as a wire transfer of funds. When the victim completes the transfer, the funds are 
wired to the attacker’s account instead of a legitimate customer or vendor’s account 
(Salahdine & Kaabouch, 2019). 
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Thompson (2012) stated that many attacks start with a bad user decision or a 
result of human error, while anyone can be tricked by a phishing attack. Many 
attackers use what users know against them. For instance, many phishing emails 
warn the reader not to click on any links, but instead go to a website and download 
a document (Thompson, 2012). Attackers count on users taking into account only 
static information about what they have learned on phishing and not to think 
critically about the actions they are being asked to do (Thompson, 2012). Moreover, 
human error as a result of not paying close attention or being in a distracted 
environment may cause users further to fall for phishing attacks (Jensen et al., 
2017). 
A number of studies used university communities (students, staff, faculty, & 
surrounding communities) as participants for their research which may limit 
somewhat the validity of their results for the typical organizational employee at a 
business or government entity when it comes to phishing (Brustoloni & Villamarín-
Salomón, 2007; Goel et al., 2017; Jensen et al., 2017; Musuva et al., 2019). Goel et 
al. (2017) used third- and fourth-year undergraduate students as participants in their 
study, while Jensen et al. (2017) and Musuva et al. (2019) used students, faculty, 
and staff as their study participants. Brustoloni and Villamarín-Salomón (2007) 
uses the entire university community as their participants.  
Finn and Jakobsson (2007) categorized phishing studies into three groups: 
survey, closed-lab experiment, and simulations. A survey study presents the 
participants with a survey asking what their reaction to an event would be. Bravo-
Lillo et al. (2011) used an interview survey to understand perception of risk of a 
chosen action. A closed-lab experiment is one in which participants are aware of 
the focus of the study, and, therefore, the results may be somewhat skewed (Finn 
& Jakobsson, 2007). An example of a closed-lab experiment is Algarni et al. 
(2017)’s study, where they used a role-play questionnaire in which participants 
were shown Facebook profiles and then asked about the trustworthiness of those 
profiles, Algarni et al. (2017) acknowledged that participant reaction may be 
skewed because the participants were aware of the study.  
The third kind of study according to Finn and Jakobsson (2007) is a simulation 
study in which the research design mimics a real-world scenario. Finn and 
Jakobsson (2007) discussed ethical considerations with regards to simulation 
studies. Simulation studies seem to be the most widely used of the three types of 
studies, as they have been used to understand phishing behavior (Burns et al., 2019; 
Goel et al., 2017; Gordon et al., 2019). Musuva et al. (2019) used a simulation study 
which had to be curtailed because a social media activist sent out an alert regarding 
the phishes in the investigation which caused the university to end the study. 
Musuva et al. (2019) stated that the viral nature of the alert and the alert itself 
illustrates the power of vigilant and informed users. 
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Heuristics 
Kahneman (2011) introduced the concepts of System One and System Two as 
methods of describing human cognition. System One represents an instinctual 
thought process that comes quickly and automatically and requires little or no 
effort. Examples of System One are the ability to orient to a sudden sound or to 
detect if one object is closer than another (Kahneman, 2011). System Two is a slow, 
methodical thought process that requires deliberate effort. Examples of System 
Two are solving a complex mathematical equation or monitoring one’s behavior in 
a social situation (Kahneman, 2011). For typical, daily activities, System One is 
active, and System Two is in a low-effort mode. When System One encounters a 
more difficult task, it activates System Two. As a difficult task becomes more 
familiar, System One is able to take over the task. Kahneman (2011) stated that, 
given multiple ways to solve a problem, people will typically choose the path that 
requires the least amount of effort. As an illustration, he referenced a study in which 
college students were asked to solve a simple mathematical problem with an 
intuitive answer that was incorrect. They indicated that the students did not check 
their work, although checking their work would have been easy to do. Kahneman 
(2011) also stated that task-switching is difficult, but that System Two can program 
the memory to override habit.  
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) introduced the idea of a heuristic decision-
making process that does not follow Bayesian probability. Kahneman (2011) 
describes a heuristic as an assumption made to simplify a decision. According to 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974), if Bayesian probability were used, there would be 
evidence of using prior probabilities when making a decision. They referenced a 
study in which participants were given a description of a person in a group and 
asked if they thought that that person was a librarian or an engineer. In the study, 
some participants were told that there were more engineers than librarians in the 
group, and some were told that there were more librarians than engineers in the 
group. The result was that only the description of the person affected the 
participant’s decision. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) explained this departure 
from Bayesian probability by stating that decision-makers tend to use heuristic, 
intuitive judgement although that judgement may be wrong.   
Gigerenzer (1991) countered Tversky and Kahneman (1974) by arguing that 
errors in judgement are not violations of probability theory. Gigerenzer (1991) 
questioned the methods of Tversky and Kahneman (1974), stating that Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) used too narrow a definition of norm and too highly selected a 
sample to be used in traditional probability and statistics. Kahneman and Tversky 
(1996) answered Gigerenzer (1991), stating that only two of the 12 biases they 
referenced in 1974 apply to Gigerenzer’s argument, and they countered 
Gigerenzer’s claim that judgement heuristics are independent of context. In turn, 
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Gigerenzer (1996) stated that the problem with heuristics is that it can be fit to any 
situation yet is too vague. Gigerenzer (1996) also countered the number of biases 
referenced by Kahneman and Tversky (1996), stating that he found thirteen biases 
and that five apply to his former argument. Vranas (2000) attempted to clear up 
misunderstandings in the debate between Kahneman and Tversky and Gigerenzer. 
He stated that Gigerenzer preferred to look at cognitive processes underlying 
decision making. Vranas (2000) stated that Gigerenzer was not stating that single-
case judgements are invalid but that Gigerenzer wanted Kahneman and Tversky to 
present a proof that they are valid. Vranas (2000) stated that he did not think a proof 
was necessary and that Gigerenzer was assuming a frequentist view of statistics 
when it was likely that a subjectivist view was more appropriate. Both Kahneman 
and Gigerenzer reviewed Vranas (2000) before it was published. 
A third model of decision making called the Recognition-Primed Decision 
(RPD) model was introduced by Klein (1993). Klein (1993) described the RPD 
model as a model in which the decision maker does not make a choice between two 
or more options, but instead acts based on prior experience. Klein (1993) used the 
example of a firefighter chief in action at a fire. Asked afterwards how he chose 
what to do, the chief stated that he made no conscience choice and simply sprang 
into action.  
There have been many studies regarding how heuristics may affect user 
decision-making when faced with a computer security decision (Anderson et al., 
2016; Bravo-Lillo et al., 2011; Gerlach et al., 2019). Many of the studies regarding 
heuristics used some kind of role-playing methodology in which the participants 
were given a scenario and asked for their response, either through interview (Arazy 
et al., 2017; Bravo-Lillo et al., 2011) or through action (Anderson et al., 2016; 
Gerlach et al., 2019).  
Students appeared to be a common sample in these types of investigations 
(Anderson et al., 2016; Arazy et al., 2017; Bravo-Lillo et al., 2011), and one study 
used a professional firm to recruit participants (Gerlach et al., 2019). Two of the 
studies (Arazy et al., 2017; Bravo-Lillo et al., 2011) distinguished between novice 
and advanced users. Bravo-Lillo et al. (2011) distinguished advanced users by 
whether they had taken at least one computer security course or had worked in the 
computer security field for at least a year. Arazy et al. (2017) used professional 
university librarians as advanced users. 
In general, the results of the studies regarding heuristics showed that some level 
of misjudgment occurs when heuristics are used (Bravo-Lillo et al., 2011; Gerlach 
et al., 2019). Bravo-Lillo et al. (2011) noted that advanced users differ from novice 
users in that advanced users judge risk before taking action while novice users judge 
risk after taking an action. Anderson et al. (2016) stated as an implication that 
methods that reduce habituation should be used when displaying a warning. The 
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stated implication of Arazy et al. (2017) was that measuring heuristics is difficult. 
For future research, Gerlach et al. (2019) encouraged further research on how 
heuristics affects privacy-related beliefs. 
METHODOLOGY 
This study is the first in a sequence of several studies that will investigate 
whether requiring email users to pause by displaying an email warning with a timer 
(countdown, count-up, or no counter as a control) when they are presented with a 
potentially malicious email has any effect on the percentage of them falling to 
phishing attacks. This research phase of the larger study will start with the 
collection of qualitative and quantitative data from SMEs (Straub, 1989). The 
objective of this study is to find a validated timer level at which to set the 
countdown or count-up timer to display in the mobile app that will later be 
developed based on the initial findings of the level of pausing from the SMEs. The 
Delphi method will be utilized with multiple rounds until a consensus is reached 
(Ramim & Lichvar, 2014). The objective of the next step of this on-going research 
study will be to develop, test, and validate a custom mobile app. The mobile app 
will be a Gmail-like client. In the proposed app, a dialog will overlay any email that 
has a link, and the dialog will not be dismissible. The dialog will have a countdown 
or count-up timer set to a value that will be determined by the first research 
question. The independent variables that will be used in the app for the treatment 
groups are timer level and the type of timer (countdown or count-up) determined 
by the SMEs. A quantitative and qualitative survey will be developed to capture the 
SMEs’ feedback that will include a step-by-step process of what users will 
eventually see, however, in this initial assessment, the SMEs will be asked in the 
quantitative portion of the survey the recommended level of timer to use within the 
app. Moreover, they will be provided with a set of experimental protocols and be 
asked whether to (1) “Keep”, (2) “Adjust”, or (3) “Remove” each step of the 
experiments. If the SME proposes “Adjust” or “Remove”, they will be asked in the 
qualitative part of the survey to provide feedback on how to adjust or why to remove 
that step. Averages of the proposed pause time to use within the app will be 
calculated and Kendal W nonparametric statistics will be assessed to ensure SMEs 
consensus is reached or additional Delphi rounds needed to further refine the 
agreement among the SMEs.  
Proposed Field Experiments  
As part of this study, the SMEs will be asked to validate the protocol of the 
proposed field experiments. The two proposed field experiments, upon validation 
from the SMEs, will be coded into an app to be used later with participants in future 
research. This proposed study is the first in a series of studies that offer promise to 
address this problem because the polymorphic techniques proposed are designed to 
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engage the slow, logical thought process of the email user on a mobile device. 
Engaging the email user in a logical thought process is promising because errors in 
judgement have been found to occur when people use heuristics (Gerlach et al., 
2019; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Using a countdown or count-up timer as part 
of the warning message is promising because it has been shown that people often 
assess timed events as important (Acquisti et al., 2017). Brustoloni and Villamarín-
Salomón (2007) found that polymorphic warnings help to mitigate unjustified risk, 
as well as Anderson et al. (2016) and Egelman et al. (2008) both found polymorphic 
warnings to be more effective than static warnings. De Keukelaere et al. (2009) 
presented a machine-learning algorithm in a custom app that received as input the 
user’s experience and outputted a custom warning message. They also presented a 
dialog that gave feedback to the participant. They found that participants who were 
given the custom message took more time to decide on a potentially unsafe action 
than participants who were given a static warning dialog.  
During the field studies, participants, who will have been recruited via Facebook 
and LinkedIn, will be asked to check a Gmail-like account through the app. A 
special email will be created for the users with indication that some promotions and 
added-value benefits will be provided via that email. Yan et al. (2015) studied user 
behavior for one week. Since this study is also analyzing user behavior, participants 
will be asked to check their newly created “promotional” email through the app for 
seven days. A phishing campaign service will be used to send phishes to the 
participants along with several legitimate emails including Groupons and other 
localized promotional benefits. Alert Logic (2018) stated that the average user 
receives 17 malicious emails per month. Therefore, each participant will receive 
four phishes through the phishing campaign service during the seven days in which 
they are participating in this study, which will also incorporate any real phishes 
received. The list of participants, with demographic information but with no PII, 
will be used to randomly organize the participants into two evenly sized groups, 
while the demographic factors will be checked for valid distributions. Both groups 
will receive the same phishing emails and will be asked to participate for the same 
length of time such that one group participates in the study before the other group. 
Since each group of participants will be asked to participate for seven days, the total 
study duration will be 14 days.  
The app will collect and store anonymous data from the participants. When 
participants download the app, they will be given a User Identification Number 
(UIN) which will be used to link their anonymous data to their profile, and 
participants will be asked to take a short survey which will include demographic 
questions. No PII data will be captured or stored and no linking between an 
individual user and their data will be done to ensure participants’ protection under 
the Institutional Review Board (IRB) provided for the study. In particular, 
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participant age, gender, education level, attention span, and the amount of email 
they receive will be stored. Attention span will be measured with an attention span 
test by Psychology Today (n.d.) which will be embedded in the app survey. For 
each email with a potentially malicious link opened, the data collected will be: (1) 
the URL of the link, and (2) whether or not the participant clicked on the link. The 
data will be stored in Google forms.  
Validity and Reliability 
External validity refers to the generalizability of results (Sekaran & Bougie, 
2016). Since this study uses SMEs to determine the timer level for the mobile app, 
external validity is increased. In addition, SMEs will be used to test and validate 
the mobile app itself. Reliability is the measure of how consistent experimental 
results are as time passes (Sekaran & Bougie, 2016). A study is considered reliable 
if the same input consistently produces the same output (Ellis & Levy, 2009). In 
addition, stability reliability refers to how an instrument produces output over a 
period of time (Ellis & Levy, 2009; Sekaran & Bougie, 2016). Since the mobile app 
will be tested for functionality by SMEs, reliability will be increased. 
 
Figure 1: Field Experiment Design 
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ANTICIPATED RESULTS 
This study is expected to collect data from the SMEs on the proposed field 
experiments and provide support to ensure their validity in order to proceed to the 
next step of the research. Results are expected to include data from 20 SMEs. 
Results are expected to give a guideline for timer values for use in the countdown 
and count-up timers and to validate the custom mobile app that will be used in the 
subsequent field experiments.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Phishing is still a significant problem to be solved. Billions of dollars and 
personal and corporate data are lost to phishing attacks each year (FBI, 2018). This 
research is the first in a series of research studies that propose to mitigate phishing 
by requiring the user to pause before opening an email, thus moving the user from 
a quick, instinctual mindset to a logical, thoughtful mindset. SME opinions will be 
gathered for timer values, which will be used in a countdown or count-up dialog 
that requires the user to pause before continuing to read an opened email. SMEs 
feedback will also be used to validate and verify functionality of a custom mobile 
app which will be used for subsequent studies. External validity will be controlled 
in this series of studies since participants will be asked to use a Gmail-like accounts 
that will be made for them during the experiments.  
A limitation of this study is the software life cycle for the custom mobile app. If 
the app is shown to have serious defects, the time to fix those defects may be 
lengthy and discourage the users from continuing to participate in the study. As 
such following the SMEs phase of the study, a pilot study with small group of users 
will be done to assess any issues in the app that will then be corrected before the 
full study will engage the participants. Another limitation may be that this research 
uses Gmail-like email rather than true personal Gmail account and thus the volume 
of emails received on that email may not be the same as other. In an effort to 
mitigate this potential limitation, the special email account of all participants will 
be subscribed for several promotional services such as Yelp, Google Maps, 
Groupon, Etsy, and several regular retail companies such as Macys, 
Bloomingdales, William Sonoma, Saks Fifth, Guess, etc. to ensure these accounts 
generate significant volume of emails to mimic real-life environment. Future 
research will include using the custom mobile app to test participants’ ability to 
avoid phishes when presented with a countdown or count-up timer. Future work 
may also include using a timer to mitigate browser users’ susceptibility to malicious 
links in webpages. The results of these future studies will provide further 
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understanding in the body of knowledge of the role heuristics and habit play in 
phishing mitigation. 
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